Unduly Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts Are Undermining Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt by Litman, Leah M.
Michigan Law Review Online 
Volume 116 Article 4 
2017 
Unduly Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts Are 
Undermining Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
Litman M. Leah 
University of California, Irvine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and 
the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Litman M. Leah, Unduly Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts Are Undermining Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 50 (2017). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online/vol116/iss1/4 
 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review Online by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
50 
UNDULY BURDENING WOMEN’S HEALTH:  
HOW LOWER COURTS ARE UNDERMINING 
WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT 
Leah M. Litman*
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the Supreme Court’s 2016 Term, the Court issued its deci-
sion in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.1 One of the more closely 
watched cases of that Term, Hellerstedt asked whether the Supreme Court 
would adhere to its prior decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which re-
affirmed that women have a constitutionally protected right to decide to end 
a pregnancy.2 
The state of Texas had not formally requested that the Court revisit Ca-
sey or the earlier decision Casey had affirmed, Roe v. Wade,3 in Hellerstedt. 
But that was what Texas was, in effect, asking the Court to do. If Texas were 
correct in Hellerstedt that the challenged abortion restrictions were valid,4 
the right to decide to end a pregnancy would have amounted to little more 
than a fiction. The Texas restrictions at issue in Hellerstedt required doctors 
providing abortions to have admitting privileges at hospitals within thirty 
miles of where the doctor performed abortions and required facilities 
providing abortions to comply with the litany of restrictions applicable to 
ambulatory surgical centers.5 There was no evidence that either of the re-
strictions made abortion safer, and their combined effect was to reduce the 
number of clinics in the state of Texas from over forty to seven, all of which 
would have been concentrated in the Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, Austin, 
and San Antonio metropolitan regions.6 If states could enact such severe re-
strictions without having to establish that the restrictions actually serve a val-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. I was one
of the counsel to Whole Woman’s Health in the Supreme Court case discussed in this piece. 
1. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. See Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300–01, 2319–20.
5. Id. at 2300.
6. Id. at 2301–02.
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id purpose, it is not hard to imagine that the right to decide to end a preg-
nancy would have become a right in name only. 
That’s not the path the Supreme Court took. Instead, in Hellerstedt, the 
Court affirmed that women have a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in deciding to end a pregnancy.7 And because women have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest to decide to end a pregnancy, the Court also reaf-
firmed that restrictions on abortions are invalid if they place an “undue bur-
den” on a woman’s decision to have an abortion.8 That standard, the Court 
explained, requires courts to consider “the burdens a law imposes on abor-
tion access together with the benefits” when determining if an abortion re-
striction imposes an undue burden.9 It also requires courts to assess whether 
an abortion restriction furthers a valid purpose rather than to defer to any 
justification that the state claims is reasonable.10 
For whatever reason, states and the federal courts of appeals do not seem 
to have gotten the message, or they are just refusing to hear it. States and 
courts of appeals are seeking to cabin Hellerstedt in a variety of unpersuasive 
ways and recycling—occasionally with success—many of the arguments that 
Hellerstedt rejected. This Essay outlines how they are doing so before touch-
ing on why it may be occurring. 
ARTIFICIAL LIMITS 
It is unlikely that any one case will end legislative and legal challenges to 
women’s ability to decide whether to have a child. Writing on the heels of 
the election, one commentator wrote that “[t]he threat to abortion rights . . . 
is from politicians who, with the help of lawyers, will continue to try . . . and 
drain the legal standards governing abortion of any meaning.”11 Consider 
some of the ways they are doing so now. 
A. Limiting the Framework’s Applicability 
Several states have attempted to limit Hellerstedt by insisting the frame-
work the Court affirmed in that case does not apply to other cases involving 
other kinds of abortion restrictions. In response to challenges to questiona-
ble laws that include a requirement that fetal tissue be buried or cremated, a 
requirement that women view an ultrasound eighteen hours before an abor-
tion, and bans on a safe and common type of procedure, state attorneys gen-
eral are arguing that the Hellerstedt explanation of the undue burden stand-
ard does not apply where an abortion restriction purportedly protects fetal 
7. See id. at 2298.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2309.
10. Id. at 2309–10.
11. Leah M. Litman, Potential Life in the Doctrine, 95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 204, 204–05
(2017), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Litman-Vol95-SeeAlso.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3M96-2YNH]. 
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life as opposed to protecting women’s health.12 In Hellerstedt, they note, the 
state argued its laws protect women’s health, and so, they insist, the standard 
applied by Hellerstedt does not apply to laws that serve other purposes.13 
While it may be more difficult to assess the relative benefits and burdens 
where a law purports to protect fetal life,14 it hardly follows that courts 
should not apply the undue burden standard to such laws. It would make lit-
tle sense if courts applied different standards depending on what interest a 
state invoked; states could merely declare that an abortion restriction serves 
a different purpose in order to have the law reviewed under a more lenient 
standard. Indeed, there is evidence that Texas has done just that, both in Hel-
lerstedt, and in another case arising out of Texas that is currently before the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Hellerstedt, Texas offered shifting ration-
ales for its restrictions. The law invoked maternal health, and the state ini-
tially did the same in the early stage of the litigation.15 Later on, however, 
Texas added to what the law said, and argued that its restrictions both pro-
mote women’s health and protect fetal life.16 It strains credulity to think that 
the Supreme Court would have applied an entirely different standard had the 
state, in its brief to the Court, recited the words “protecting fetal life.” Simi-
larly, in a more recent case out of Texas, also captioned Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, Texas initially claimed in its regulations that it was pro-
tecting maternal health,17 but after some time passed following the Supreme 
12. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 5, 17–18, Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v.
Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, No. 17-1883 (7th Cir. June 27, 2017); Brief for Defendant-
Appellant at 5, 19–20, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 17-50154 (5th Cir. May 30, 
2017); Brief of the Attorneys General of the States of Louisiana et al. by and Through Their 
Governors in Support of Appellants and Reversal at 1–2, 17–22, W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Mil-
ler, No. 16-17296 (11th Cir. Mar. 17, 2017); Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for a 
Temp. Restraining Order at 2, 11, Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. 1:17-CV-00690-LY 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017); Defendant’s Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, 
37, Hopkins v. Jegley, No. 4:17-CV-00404-KGB (E. D. Ark. July 11, 2017). 
13. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 17–18, Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v.
Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, No. 17-1883 (7th Cir. June 27, 2017); Brief for Defendant-
Appellant at 19–20, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 17-50154 (5th Cir. May 30, 
2017). 
14. Litman, supra note 11, at 207–10.
15. TEX. S. RESEARCH CTR., BILL ANALYSIS OF H.B. 2, HB 83-2, 3d Sess. (2013), http://
www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/832/analysis/html/HB00002E.htm [https://perma.cc/9LL6-JK6K]; 
State Defendants’ Trial Brief at 42, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. 
v. Abbott (Abbott I), 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00862) (“HB 2 was
enacted to protect the health and safety of patients . . . .”). 
16. Appellants’ Brief at 2, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v.
Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-51008); see also Appellants’ Reply 
Brief at 6, Abbott II, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-51008) (“The admitting-privileges 
requirement was enacted to make abortions safer for patients who choose abortion and to pro-
tect fetal life for those patients who do not.”). 
17. See 41 Tex. Reg. 4772, 4773 (July 1, 2016); see also Tex. Reg. 7659, 7660 (Sept. 30,
2016) (clarifying the health and safety interest as preventing the spread of disease). 
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Court’s decision in Hellerstedt, Texas began arguing that its restriction actu-
ally protected fetal life.18 
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has, since Casey, only ever 
announced there to be one standard that governs the constitutionality of re-
strictions on abortion access—the undue burden standard. That is the stand-
ard the Court referred to in Casey and all subsequent cases involving re-
strictions on patients, doctors, and clinics.19 And that is the standard the 
Court reaffirmed in Hellerstedt. Hellerstedt reaffirmed that standard for all 
cases, not merely ones where a state recites an interest in maternal health.20 
That’s not surprising, given that Casey announced the undue burden stand-
ard as one standard.21 Casey also applied the undue burden standard to re-
strictions that did not purport to promote maternal health, but instead pur-
ported to protect potential life.22 That’s the very same standard that the 
Court reaffirmed in Hellerstedt, and there’s no basis to say that standard does 
not apply to other kinds of abortion restrictions. 
While no court so far has accepted the argument for two legal standards, 
states unable to succeed in the district courts have filed appeals that are 
pending in the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. The courts of 
appeals now have the chance to rule on the issue. Any decision recognizing 
two tests would disregard the Supreme Court’s clear holding to the contrary. 
B. Requiring Unnecessary Findings of Fact 
If states were just making arguments artificially cabining Hellerstedt, it 
would be one thing. But courts are accepting some of those arguments, and, 
in doing so, reaching decisions that are hard to square with Hellerstedt. 
Consider the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Arkansas & Eastern Oklahoma v. Jegley, which up-
held an Arkansas requirement that medication-abortion providers must 
18. 41 Tex. Reg. 9709, 9732 (Dec. 9. 2016); Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 19, Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 17-50154 (5th Cir. May 30, 2017). 
19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (plurality opinion).
20. 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts con-
sider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws con-
fer.”). 
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (explaining that “it is important to clarify what is meant by an
undue burden,” which is “a standard of general application”); id. at 877 (“[A]n undue burden 
is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”); id. at 
878. 
22. Id. at 881–82 (discussing the “interest in potential life” with respect to an informed
consent requirement); Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (explaining Casey’s application of the un-
due burden standard); Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98 (applying the undue burden standard to the 
spousal notification requirement without suggesting requirement was motivated by health rea-
sons); id. at 900–01 (applying undue burden standard to restrictions motivated by “medical 
research”). 
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have a contract with a physician who has hospital admitting privileges.23 The 
restriction is similar in obvious ways to the restriction at issue in Heller-
stedt—its substance pertains to admitting privileges, its effect would be to 
reduce the number of clinics in Arkansas from three to one, and that clinic 
would only be able to provide surgical abortions.24 Also, as in Hellerstedt, 
there is no evidence that the new requirement improves health outcomes 
from the preexisting rules regarding medication abortions. Medication abor-
tions are extremely safe,25 and providers can refer patients to clinics or health 
centers for minor complications and consult with emergency room doctors 
as needed.26 The district court in Jegley had preliminarily enjoined the state 
from enforcing that requirement, concluding there was little evidence of the 
requirement’s benefits but considerable evidence of the extent of its bur-
dens.27 
The Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, insisting that the 
district court had not made the required findings of fact to preliminarily en-
join the requirement. The Eighth Circuit explained that the district court 
“did not define or estimate the number of women who would be unduly 
burdened” by the requirement because it “did not determine how many 
women would face increased travel distances.” Additionally, “the district 
court did not explain” what it meant by “women in the Fayetteville area.”28 
Nor had the district court “estimate[d] the number of women who would 
forgo abortions” or “estimate[d] the number of women who would postpone 
their abortions.”29 
Whether or not that is a fair interpretation of the district court’s opinion 
in Jegley, it is not a fair interpretation of what Hellerstedt requires. There 
were zero findings in Hellerstedt on the number of women who would forgo 
or postpone abortions, or an estimate of the number of women who “would 
be unduly burdened.”30 Instead, the Supreme Court relied on findings about 
the number of abortions that were performed in the state, the number of 
clinics that would be left in the state to perform them, and the location of the 
clinics. Nor did Hellerstedt—or the district court in that case31—define what 
it meant by the “Houston, Austin, San Antonio, and the Dallas/Fort Worth 
23. 864 F.3d 953, 958–59 (8th Cir. 2017).
24. Jegley, 864 F.3d at 956–57.
25. See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2311 (citing evidence of “at least five peer-reviewed studies 
on abortion complications in the first trimester, showing that the highest rate of major compli-
cations . . . was less than one-quarter of 1%” (citations omitted)). 
26. Jegley, 864 F.3d at 956.
27. Id. at 956–57.
28. Id. at 959.
29. Id. at 959–60.
30. Id. at 959.
31. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
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metropolitan region” in contrast with what the Eighth Circuit seemed to re-
quire in Jegley.32 
When Hellerstedt invalidated the admitting-privileges requirement, the 
Court also relied on the fact that the requirement offered no medical bene-
fits.33 The Eighth Circuit did not even factor in the lack of medical benefits 
that the admitting-privileges law offered apart from misconstruing how to 
assess the burden the law imposed. Jegley thus illustrates how at least one 
court has accepted a state’s mistaken interpretation of Hellerstedt, and, in 
doing so, has required courts to make unnecessary findings of fact before in-
validating a restriction on abortions. 
C. Misleading Readings and Limitations 
Another tactic that states and federal courts of appeals have used to try 
and limit Hellerstedt is to take statements from the decision out of context to 
support propositions that are inconsistent with other parts of the case and its 
reasoning. For example, several states are continuing to try and enforce laws 
that are materially indistinguishable from the restrictions at issue in Heller-
stedt. Louisiana is seeking to enforce a requirement that every doctor who 
performs abortions in Louisiana must have admitting privileges at a hospital 
within thirty miles of where the doctor performs abortions.34 And Missouri 
is trying to enforce a law that abortion providers meet the requirements of 
ambulatory surgical centers, as well as a law that physicians performing 
abortions maintain admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.35 
In order to defend these laws, the states try to distinguish Hellerstedt, 
which invalidated restrictions materially indistinguishable to them, in two 
respects. First, some states claim that Hellerstedt “repeatedly instructed the 
lower courts to consider ‘the record evidence’ ” and that “challenges neces-
sarily require a fact-intensive inquiry.”36 Thus, Missouri argues, it should be 
allowed to prove that its requirements actually do promote maternal health, 
even if the Supreme Court concluded that Texas’s materially indistinguisha-
ble requirements did not.37 It is helpful here to consider what the Supreme 
Court actually said when it referred to “record evidence” in Hellerstedt. Hel-
lerstedt rejected Texas’s claim that courts need not subject a state’s claim that 
its law furthered women’s health to any kind of impendent evidentiary in-
quiry: 
32. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016) (plurality opin-
ion). 
33. Id. at 2301–02.
34. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017), appeal
docketed, 17-30397 (8th Cir. May 12, 2017). 
35. Brief of Appellants at 5–7, Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great
Plains v. Hawley, No. 17-1996 (8th Cir. July 14, 2017). 
36. Id. at 43.
37. Id. at 47.
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The statement that legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of 
medical uncertainty is also inconsistent with this Court’s case law. Instead, 
the Court, when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abor-
tion procedures, has placed considerable weight upon evidence and argu-
ment presented in judicial proceedings. In Casey, for example, we relied 
heavily on the District Court’s factual findings and the research-based 
submissions of amici in declaring a portion of the law at issue unconstitu-
tional.38 
Thus, Hellerstedt rejected Texas’s argument that courts could not con-
sider evidence that a plaintiff offered to challenge an abortion restriction; it 
did not suggest states were free to relitigate Hellerstedt by offering additional 
evidence for courts to consider in order to uphold restrictions that are mate-
rially indistinguishable from the ones the Court invalidated. 
Moreover, the “record evidence” the Court cited in Hellerstedt con-
cerned the safety of abortion nationwide. The “record evidence” on the ad-
mitting privileges requirement “included” the following: 
• “A collection of at least five peer-reviewed studies on abortion complica-
tions in the first trimester, showing that the highest rate of major complica-
tions—including those complications requiring hospital admission—was
less than one-quarter of 1%.”39
• “Figures in three peer-reviewed studies showing that the highest com-
plication rate found for the much rarer second trimester abortion was
less than one-half of 1% (0.45% or about 1 out of about 200).”40
• “Expert testimony to the effect that complications rarely require hospital
admission, much less immediate transfer to a hospital from an outpatient
clinic.”41
• “[A] study of complications occurring within six weeks after 54,911 abor-
tions that had been paid for by the fee-for-service California Medicaid Pro-
gram finding that the incidence of complications was 2.1%, the incidence of
complications requiring hospital admission was 0.23%, and that of the
54,911 abortion patients included in the study, only 15 required immediate
transfer to the hospital on the day of the abortion.”42
• “Expert testimony stating that ‘it is extremely unlikely that a patient will
experience a serious complication at the clinic that requires emergent hos-
pitalization’ and ‘in the rare case in which [one does], the quality of care
38. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 888–94 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
39. Id. at 2311 (citations omitted).
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id.
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that the patient receives is not affected by whether the abortion provider 
has admitting privileges at the hospital.’ ”43 
• “[W]hen directly asked at oral argument whether Texas knew of a single in-
stance in which the new requirement would have helped even one woman
obtain better treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the
record of such a case. This answer is consistent with the findings of the oth-
er Federal District Courts that have considered the health benefits of other
States’ similar admitting-privileges laws.”44
Hellerstedt’s exhortations to consider record evidence were directives for 
courts not to blindly allow legislatures to enact laws that do not offer any real 
benefits to women’s health. They were not, as Missouri suggests, invitations 
for states and courts to disagree with the Court’s assessment of the evidence 
in Hellerstedt. And the record evidence on which Hellerstedt relied was na-
tionwide evidence that is relevant to any admitting privileges requirement. 
Another tactic that states have urged is to argue that courts are not 
“competen[t]” to review the “benefits” and “burdens” an abortion restriction 
imposes when that restriction purportedly was enacted to promote an inter-
est in potential life.45 To support that claim, the states cite Gonzales v. Car-
hart for the proposition that certain topics are “for resolution by legislatures, 
not the courts.”46 While Carhart upheld an abortion restriction, Hellerstedt 
explained what that statement in Carhart meant and what it did not. Specifi-
cally, Hellerstedt rejected the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ conclusion that 
courts “‘err[] by substituting [their] own judgment for that of the legisla-
ture’ . . . in part because ‘medical uncertainty underlying a statute is for reso-
lution by legislatures, not the courts.’ ”47 Hellerstedt explained that “[t]he 
statement that legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical 
uncertainty is also inconsistent with this Court’s case law,”48 and that Car-
hart itself still held that “[c]ourt[s] retain[] an independent constitutional du-
ty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”49 
Here too there is evidence that states are succeeding at getting courts to 
adopt these readings of Hellerstedt. In an extraordinary move, the Eighth 
Circuit went en banc, as a full court, to vacate an injunction that prohibited 
Missouri from enforcing its ambulatory-surgical-center and admitting-
43. Id. (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 2311–12 (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Halen, 94 F. Supp. 3d
949, 563 (W.D. Wis. 2015)). 
45. Brief of the Attorneys General of the States of Louisiana et al., supra note 12, at 17–
22. 
46. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 587 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)); Brief of the Attorneys General of the States of Louisiana 
et al., supra note 12, at 20–22. 
47. 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 587 (5th
Cir. 2015) (citing Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163)). 
48. Id. at 2310.
49. Id. (quoting Carhart, 550 U.S. at 165)).
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privileges requirements—even after a three judge panel had refused to vacate 
the injunction, with one dissenter.50 After the providers requested emergen-
cy relief from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit subsequently clarified 
that its order was merely an administrative stay (something it refused to tell 
the providers when they requested clarification)51 and then reinstated the 
district court’s injunction. 52 
D. Frontal Resistance 
In addition to these more back-handed ways of undermining the Su-
preme Court’s cases on reproductive justice, courts have, occasionally, at-
tempted to do so in more explicit ways. For example, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has explicitly urged the Supreme Court to “reevaluate its 
jurisprudence” on abortion.53 In that case, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a 
law that would have prohibited physicians from performing abortions when 
the physician could detect a fetal heartbeat.54 The circuit court recognized 
that “controlling Supreme Court precedent dictate[d] th[at] outcome,” but it 
continued for pages to explain the “good reasons” the Supreme Court should 
revisit those cases.55 
More recently, the Eighth Circuit ruled that women who receive health 
care from Planned Parenthood lack a private right of action to enforce a 
Medicaid Act requirement.56 The requirement—section 23(A)—provides 
that Medicaid patients must have free choice of providers. In context, this 
means that states cannot exclude providers from participating in Medicaid 
for reasons other than their fitness to provide medical services.57 Arkansas 
attempted to terminate Planned Parenthood’s ability to participate in the 
Medicaid program after a video surfaced that showed a Planned Parenthood 
employee offering to sell fetal tissue, and some patients sued to prevent that 
50. Order, Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, No.
17-1996 (8th Cir. Sept. 12, 2017) (vacating order denying stay of preliminary injunction); Or-
der, Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, No. 17-1996 (8th 
Cir. Sept. 15, 2017) (granting motion for stay of preliminary injunction). 
51. See Application to Vacate Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal at 12 n.8,
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, No. 17A328 (U.S. Sept. 
22, 2017). 
52. Order, Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, No.
17-1996 (8th Cir. Oct. 2, 2017); Amy Howe, Planned Parenthood Withdraws Application in 
Missouri Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/
planned-parenthood-withdraws-application-missouri-case/ [https://perma.cc/RN48-N3LP]. 
53. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 775 (8th Cir. 2015).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 773–76; see also id. at 772 (writing that it “ha[d] no choice but to follow the
majority of the [Supreme] Court in assuming the following principles for the purposes of th[e] 
opinion”). 
56. Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1047 (8th Cir. 2017).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2012).
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result as inconsistent with section 23(A) of the Medicaid Act. The Eighth 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action—the authorization to 
sue—under the Medicaid Act, in a decision that conflicts with decisions of 
the Sixth Circuit,58 the Seventh Circuit,59 the Third Circuit,60 the Ninth Cir-
cuit,61 and the Fifth Circuit.62 The reason why so many other courts of ap-
peals had reached a different result is because a prior Supreme Court case, 
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,63 held that plaintiffs had a private right of 
action to enforce another provision of the Medicaid Act because, among 
other reasons, the provision was “intend[ed] to benefit” them.64 The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that Wilder has since been “repudiated”—
that is, overruled—by the Supreme Court.65 The Court has never explicitly 
overruled Wilder, and it is not generally the responsibility of the courts of 
appeals to anticipate which decisions the Supreme Court will choose to over-
rule.66 
CONCLUSION 
Even if the current Supreme Court were to step in and correct the courts 
of appeals and states’ resistance to Hellerstedt, there’s no guarantee the 
harmful effects of these laws would be reversed. Many of these restrictions, 
when allowed to go into effect, result in the closure of clinics, and when a 
clinic closes, there’s the possibility that it will not reopen, even if the re-
striction that led to its closure is subsequently invalidated. The aftermath of 
Hellerstedt proves as much. Several of the clinics that closed during the peri-
od in which Texas was allowed to enforce its requirement never reopened 
58. See Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2006).
59. See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
699 F.3d 962, 974 (7th Cir. 2012). 
60. Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that other
similar provisions of Medicaid Act have private rights of action). 
61. See Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013).
62. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2017).
63. 496 U.S. 498, 510 (1990).
64. Id. at 509 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106
(1989)). 
65. Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1047 (8th Cir. 2017); id. at 1052–53 (Melloy, J., dis-
senting) (characterizing the majority opinion as concluding that the Supremely Court had im-
plicitly repudiated one of its earlier cases). 
66. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected 
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
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after the Supreme Court stayed the enforcement and ultimately invalidated 
the law.67 
It’s no secret that President Trump has promised to appoint justices to 
the Supreme Court, and judges to the courts of appeals, who would overturn 
Roe v. Wade.68 His administration has arguably sought to get a head start on 
that project by dramatically undermining the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in Hellerstedt.69 Some states and federal courts are joining in as well. 
States are urging courts to limit and undercut Hellerstedt in several respects, 
and occasionally they encounter success in court. Several of the judges on 
President Trump’s list of potential nominees to the Supreme Court authored 
or joined the opinions that wrote off Hellerstedt as all but limited to its 
facts.70 If President Trump gets the chance to appoint one of those judges, or 
another one of the judges on his list of potential nominees, to the Supreme 
Court, then they will make official what they’ve thus far only been able to say 
somewhat obliquely: Hellerstedt and Casey are no longer the law.71 
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